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FELIX FALLIBILITAS:
THE BENEFIT OF SIN'S POSSIBILITY IN
KIERKEGAARD'S THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY
Jason A. Mahn

This paper argues that anxiety, fallibility, and the possibility of sin can be used
by a person to move past moral innocence and toward mature religious faith.
I argue that the conflicting rhetorical voices in Kierkegaard's The Concept of
Anxiety should prevent interpreters such as Philip Quinn and Gregory Beabout from claiming that anxiety functions to explain sin. Anxiety more properly and paradoxically functions to develop faith. By adopting Kierkegaard's
commendation of the "fortune of fallibility," Christian theology is able to find
in anxiety not only the occasion to sin, but also a hltor of faith.

Introduction

A number of philosophers and theologians of the twentieth century audaciously claimed that anxiety, despite occasioning the "£all" into sin, can
also carve a path to creativity, courage, authenticity, or faith. This theme
of the useful-or even "saving" -function of anxiety stems back to Kierkegaard's phenomenological analysis in The Concept of Anxiety (1844).
Like its twentieth century interpreters, The Concept of Anxiety! (hereafter:
CA) distinguishes anxiety, the discontent over one's "ownmost" freedom
and the seemingly unlimited possibilities accompanying it, from fear,
the more determinate and transitory response associated with a specific threat or danger. Also like his interpreters, Kierkegaard suggests that
the phenomenon of anxiety often occasions an individual's leap into sin,
but also suggest that anxiety might awaken an individual from the sinful
"spiritlessness" of "the crowd" and thus "educate [a person] unto faith"
(CA 159). Even when they do not mention his name, the twentieth century
figures who explore the benefit of anxiety "repeat" (in Kierkegaard's nonidentical sense) a theme that they receive from Kierkegaard.
But this idea of the philosophical or spiritual benefit of anxiety is a
difficult one to maintain. If the idea now seems like a vestige of the past
century, this is perhaps due to the growth in unreflective (or even antireflective) political discourse and civic religion. At least in the United
States, the virtue of being unconditionally confident in one's moral
and religious position currently overshadows and makes unrecognizable the virtues of constant self-questioning, unease, and anxiety.2 And
yet, while suspicion of anxiety is due largely to today's ethos, there are
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also philosophical reasons to explain why the good of anxiety has faded
from view. In the twentieth century, "proponents" of anxiety often either
failed to convey the dangers of anxiety alongside its promises-thereby
characterizing anxiety in ways that were not recognizable by those who
experience it-or described anxiety's benefit so indeterminately as compared to anxiety's threat that readers were only able to make sense of and
remember anxiety's negative function.
Heidegger and his theological counterpart, Paul Tillich, fall into the
first hazard. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the distinctive way in
which Dasein is disclosed through anxiety.3 Through anxiety, the individual senses that he or she is "not-at-home" in the world. Anxiety, with its
sense of the "uncanny," calls the individual back from absorption into the
inauthentic world of the mass-man to an authentic "Being-in-the-world."
While much of this analysis is compelling, any theologian interested in
the dynamics of sin should be suspicious of this unambiguously positive
function of anxiety. Anxiety, for Heidegger, cannot harm to the degree
ito which it can help, if only because, according to his ontology, humanity is always already "fallen" into inauthenticity, and has nowhere to go
than "up." Tillich too tends to portray anxiety in wholly and inevitably
'beneficial terms. His The Courage to Be4 suggests that anxiety is related
to courage as non-being is related to Being. According to Tillich's ontology, the first elements (anxiety, non-being) are derivative and productive of the second elements (courage, Being). Just as being includes and
overcomes non-being in its own self-genesis, so too does courage depend
on and overcome anxiety. In their portrayals of anxiety as "opening" an
individual toward Being, both Tillich and Heidegger downplay the more
"everyday" danger associated with anxiety-the danger of sin.
The opposing pitfall characterizes the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and
Edward Farley. Whereas Heidegger and Tillich portray anxiety in overly
optimistic terms (and "overly-ontological" terms-especially for the postliberal theologian), Niebuhr portrays the dangers of anxiety in far more
determinate, memorable and theological terms than he portrays anxiety's
benefit. For Niebuhr, anxiety is "a permanent concomitant of freedom,
[and] is thus both the source of creativity and a temptation to sin."s Notice
here that whereas "temptation" and "sin" nicely fit within Niebuhr's Christian tradition, "creativity" does not. The connection between anxiety and
Christian salvation appears much more ambiguous and circuitous than
the connection between anxiety and sin. The late twentieth-century theologian Edward Farley likewise writes of positive responses to anxiety-including creativity, vitality and wonder-in ways that are less indebted to
the Christian narrative than is their negative correlate-idolatry.6 Niebuhr
and Farley thus give a theologically detailed account of the transition from
anxiety to sin, but fail to describe the transition from anxiety to "creativity" or "wonder" in theologically compelling terms. We will return to the
opposing pitfalls represented by Heidegger/Tillich and Niebuhr/Farley at
the close of this paper.
The limitations of these analyses may help account for why the benefit
of anxiety has not yet gripped Western consciousness. The shortcomings,
however, should not overshadow the fact that these figures do well to
indicate the benefit of anxiety. Without some description of the benefit
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of anxiety, and with it of the possibility of sin, the Christian theologian is
hard pressed to distinguish the virtue of faith as a struggle against temptation and anxiety from the untested "innocence" of one who knows neither
testing nor struggle. Today, when the Church appears to many as an artificial sanctuary from real-world trouble, it is imperative that Christian theologians distinguish their visions of salvation and virtue from the wishes
of the pusillanimous. This distinction between untested innocence and robust redemption has sometimes been expressed through the theme of felix
culpa, or the fortunate Fall. Despite noteworthy variations, the felix culpa
theme commonly articulates that the beatitude of salvation so surpasses
the good of original innocence that the intervening sin comes to be known
as "necessary" or even "happy."? The redeemed, having traveled through
sin and suffering, are given an outstanding joy that justifies the Fall. However, as the term "justify" suggests, the theme of the fortunate Fall often
entails the philosophical enterprise of theodicy (literally, "the justification
of God"), an enterprise which theologians find increasingly problematic. s
The fortune of anxiety-or what I will call felix fallibilitas-provides an
alternative, more promising way to distinguish redemption from untested
innocence. The acceptance of anxiety and the battle against sin's possibility might by themselves distinguish the mature krlight of faith from the
presumed "innocence" of the uninitiated.
In this paper I will develop and commend the benefits of anxiety, fallibility, and the possibility of sin to constructive Christian theology. (For
the purposes of this proposal, these terms are functionally equivalent and
overlap considerably: "fallibility" refers to the "non-coincidence"9 of an
individual with herself that makes moral failure and self-transcendence
possible; "anxiety" refers to the individual's experience of this non-coincidence; and "the possibility of sin" refers to this experience as it is normally
felt-as the possibility of failure.) Kierkegaard, like Heidegger and the
others, understands that anxiety is both beneficial and ethically-religiously dangerous. Unlike his twentieth-century heirs, Kierkegaard's description of the good of anxiety, or the fortune of fallibility, is neither vaguely
humanistic nor incongruously ontological. It is rather-like his analysis
of the negative, sinful response of fallibility-theological through and
through. By adopting his conception, contemporary Christian theology
is able to find in human anxiety not only the temptation to sin, but also a
precursor to and tutor of faith.
Before developing these initial suggestions more substantively, I must
introduce one common interpretation of Kierkegaardian anxiety that this
essay explicitly counters. Many have debated whether the anxiety within
CA helps explain an individual's "leap" into sin. Philip Quinn's foundational essay, "Does Anxiety Explain Original Sin?" began this trend. It was responded to by Gregory Beabout in his, "Does Anxiety Explain Hereditary
Sin?"l0 These interpreters share my assumption that anxiety can be good.
They, however, assume that the" goodness" of anxiety is found in the way
that it helps explain the onset of sin. According to them, anxiety is a tool
for theologians and philosophers of religion to retrospectively make sense
of moral evil. In confining the positive function of anxiety to an explanatory principle, interpreters such as Quinn and Beabout not only overlook
the more theologically peculiar and noteworthy function of anxiety; they
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also distort that function by confining it within the enterprise of theodicy,
broadly construed. Because these interpretive assumptions are frequent
and powerful-not to mention illuminating of much of Kierkegaard's
text-a good deal of my essay will question whether they do justice to the
full complexity of Kierkegaard's analysis and rhetorical voice.
The first section of this paper traces the relationship between the lure of
anxiety and the leap of sin through the first part of CA. Here I argue that
the text's conflicted narrative voice prevents the readers from aligning the
phenomenology of anxiety with theological assertions about sin. The dual
perspective and conflicting voices of CA thereby call into question discussions of whether anxiety explains sin. In the second section, I turn explicitly to the interpretations of Beabout and Quinn in order both to exhibit
that their investigations are misplaced and to reintroduce the alternative
role of anxiety. In the final section, I develop the alternative understanding
of fortunate fallibility (felix fallibilitas) by understanding CA in light of its
brief final chapter, "Anxiety as Saving through faith," and then by situating CA beside Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus works.
I. The Voices of Haufniensis

Kierkegaard wrote The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation 011 the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis (the "Watchman over the Harbor") during
his first authorship (the corpus up to and including Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments). It is most commonly read as a
psycho-theological investigation into original and subsequent sin, with
"original" referring both to Adam's sin and the first sin of each individual.
(Haufniensis takes pains not to place Adam "fantastically" outside human history. Adam-Hebrew for "the man" -is one of us, if also in idealized form.) Subtitle notwithstanding- CA is anything but "simple." The
deliberation offers an extended phenomenological (or "psychological")
account of human anxiety while gesturing toward the theological issue
of hereditary sin. But the author also refuses to theorize how phenomenology and theology relate-how observing anxiety affects one's understanding (or confession) of sin. The work also entails an extended critique
of "speculative" objectivity, but is ironically written through an observational psychologist-a "Watchman" -who "sits and traces the contours
and calculates the angles of possibility," and who is "disturbed" no more
than Archimedes (CA 23).
Many scholars, including the two considered below, suppose that
Haufniensis's observations about anxiety directly inform Kierkegaard's
understanding of sin. This assumption is mistaken on two accounts. First,
it assumes a false identity, or at least an unjustifiable degree of continuity,
between Haufniensis as a poetized persona who authors CA and Kierkegaard as a real person who "authors" Haufniensis. (The distinction between
Kierkegaard and Haufniensis will become important when we contextualize CA among Kierkegaard's other pseudonymous works.) Second, the
assumption that the phenomenology of anxiety directly contributes to a
Christian hamartiology (understanding of sin) overlooks or disregards the
presence of two distinct, vying perspectives or "voices" that run through-
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out Haufniensis's text. These voices-one psychological/phenomenological and the other theological-do not harmonize. Haufniensis's text reads
like a dialogical pursuit through mixed metaphors and a shifting narrative voice rather than as a univocal discourse from within methodological
bounds. The narrator's voice is interdisciplinary, and therefore makeshift,
and sometimes disjointed. One might even claim that a certain degree
of "double talk" by Haufniensis reveals his own anxiety, despite his attempts not to be disturbed (p. 23).11 If the phenomenology of anxiety and
the doctrine of sin relate, it is only through the reciprocally-questioning
antagonism between these psychological and dogmatic perspectives. In
this section, I analyze the opening chapters of CA in order to highlight
the tension between psychology'S description of the anxiety-laden context
that makes sin possible and the theological (or "dogmatic") assertion that
sin is only presupposed by sin.12
The "theological" voice surfaces immediately in CA's Introduction as
Haufniensis critiques the ethical-religious assumptions of Hegelian mediation, whether of Hegel or of Danish Hegelians. 13 In particular, the author
denounces the role that "the negative" plays in Hegelian metaphysics (pp.
12-13). Haufniensis, like other Kierkegaardian personae, generally mocks
the "illusion" through which the negative "brings movement into all things"
(p. 12). He critiques Hegel for confusing the immanent movement of logic, where every state is a transition and therefore merely "quantitatively"
distinguished from every other state, with lived existence, where change
requires a "transcendent" interruption, and where true becoming takes
the form of a "qualitative leap."l-l Haufniensis even mockingly compares
Hegel's ability to bring a qualitative state out of quantitative determinations
to a children's rhyme where chanting "one-nis-ball, two-nis-balls, three-nis
balls" will eventually bring about tennis balls (p. 32). But this ethereal and
comical movement turns serious when it rolls into Hegel's ethics. "Here
one is astonished to discover that the negative is evil," Haufniensis writes
(p. 13). And so here "confusion is in full swing" (p. 13). Why is Haufniensis particularly concerned with the association between "the negative" and
"evil" and the way Hegelian mediation affects ethical-religious thought?
The discrepancy involves the question of whether sin or moral evil
can be understood as a mediating transition between ignorant innocence
and redemptive knowledge. Sin as a "determinative negative"15 plays a
fruitful role in Hegel's system. This can be seen from the way Hegel, in
his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, interprets Genesis's narrative of
the Fall as depicting (in revealed religion's Vorstellung, or "picture thinking") the transition from listless ignorance and immediacy to spirited
self-consciousness. This "transition" into sin eventually brings about
the self-identity of Absolute Knowing. 16 Hegel here adheres to a robust
and conceptualized version of felix cllipa. The Fall serves higher forms of
knowing, justifying the slaughter bench of history.
Haufniensis objects to this conception on ethical and theological
grounds. By logically explaining the onset of sin, one justifies sin ethically,
thereby assuaging guilt and bypassing the need for redemption. Even to
situate sin within an overarching context-regardless of whether that context comprises a "System" -threatens to lessen the severity of sin. Haufniens is fears that to contexhlalize is to find reasons, to justify, and to excuse.
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He insists that sin is an enigma that cannot be mediated by "the understanding."l? Put in Haufniensis's favorite terms, one cannot make sense of
the leap into sin without reducing its "qualitative" uniqueness to "quantitative determinations." From this point onward in the text, Haufniensis
consistently writes of sin as a "qualitative" interruption, a "sudden" and
"'enigmatic" "leap." He does so in order to resist any understanding of sin
that serves theodicy at the expense of moral condemnation and the need
for Christian atonement.
Such is the origin and tenor of Haufniensis's "theological" voice. But
while this voice is present on nearly every page of CA, the text's primary
:mbject matter is the concept of anxiety. And it is anxiety that Haufniensis,
in a second, psychological voice, introduces as the "intermediate term"
necessary for understanding how the choice to sin interrupts the state of
innocence (p. 49). While the leap into sin is sudden and unforeseeable,
anxiety provides a context out of which sin arises, seemingly assuaging
the absoluteness of its interruption. Moreover, whereas the onset of sin is
7ualitative, anxiety can grow in qualltitative terms. It increases in proportion to the degree to which the object of anxiety-the "nothing" of sin's
possibility-appears "more and more [as] a something" through inherited sinfulness (p. 61). ("Sinfulness" for Haufniensis indicates the increased
possibility for new and greater sin, not a condition or state of actual sin.
Moreover, the "possibility of sin," as will become more clear, does not
necessarily correspond to the probability of sinning, but points instead to
a volitional possibility that can be become more or less available according to the character of a moral agent. 1S ) Through anxiety, then, the still
innocent individual nonetheless "approaches" the leap into sin, and "innocence is [thereby] brought to its uttermost" (p. 45). Haufniensis here
seems to make sense of sin's actuality through sin's possibility by suggesting that one's anxious relationship to one's freedom commonly (or even
inevitably?) results in the choice to sin. If the theological voice condemns
Hegel's mediation, the psychological voice introduces a "mediating" concept between innocence and guilt-the concept of anxiety.
It appears that a fault-line runs through Haufniensis's text. On the theological side, he repeatedly asserts that no quantitative determination prior
to the leap into sin can lead up to or explain moral evil. Only confession of
guilt" gets at" the nature of sin. On the psychological side, he nonetheless
presents the phenomenon of anxiety as a way of situating or contextualizing this leap. Moreover, the psychological analysis of anxiety seems to
mitigate against the theological condemnation of the sinner by suggesting
that "the fall into sin always takes place in weakness" and that the one
"who becomes guilty in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is
possible to become" (p. 61). On the one side of the fault-line is the sudden
"leap" -on the other a gradual "slide."19 On the one side is the qualitative
interruption of a will-on the other human fallibility, which quantitatively
increases and finally succumbs. Much of CA manically oscillates between
voluntarism and infinite individual guilt for one's sin, on the one hand, and
the recognition of freedom's limitations and of anxiety as an assuaging "explanation" for sin, on the other. The relationship between these perspectives is strained or even contentious, fundamentally and irreconcilably so.
This fact must qualify any suggestion that anxiety "helps" to explain sin.
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Many interpreters have overlooked these dual (and dueling) perspectives, assuming that a methodological divide between psychology and
dogmatics alleviates any tension between them. According to them, psychology only understands how sin is possible by examining the anxiety
that ensues when freedom considers its limitless possibility. Dogmatics
then proclaims that sin is actual and demands that each individual claims
full responsibility for it. Haufniensis's text can encourage such demarcations. For example, the last paragraph of the work claims that "as soon as
psychology has finished with anxiety, it is to be delivered to [at aflevere til]
dogmatics" (p. 162). This might suggest complementariness between psychology and dogmatics. Yet, the clause's connotations are rather telling.
The Danish "at aflevere til" can mean "to be delivered to," as one would
deliver a message. It can also mean to surrender, or to be forced to hand
over. Such plurivocity makes the reader re-question whether the relationship between psychology and dogmatics is not more strained, and more
interesting, than many assume. The final paragraphs of the Introduction
describe how psychology "becomes deeply absorbed in the possibility of
sin, [until] it is unwittingly in the service of another science [theology, or
"dogmatics"] that only waits for it to finish so that it can begin and assist
psychology to the explanation" (p. 23, my emphasis). Here it appears as
though theology overtakes psychology once it, thoroughly enamored, can
offer little resistance. The "assistance" offered by theology looks more like
a hostile takeover.
But it is in the first two chapters of CA that the reader best hears the
mixed metaphors and dissonant voices of Haufniensis. There Haufniensis
gives his most famous description of anxiety and the onset of sin through
the analogy of a person standing over an abyss, experiencing vertigo, and
succumbing to dizziness. This re-narration of the Fall-although connected and coherent-includes two sets of images that lie on either side of the
fault line that we have introduced. We quote the passage in full:
Anxiety may be compared to dizziness. He whose eye [0ie] happens
to [kommer til at] look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy.
But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in
the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the
dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit
[viI scette] the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold [griber] of finiteness to support itself. Freedom
succumbs [segner] in this dizziness. Further than this, psychology
cannot and will not go. In that very moment [0ieblikke] everything
is changed, and freedom, when it again rises, sees that it is guilty.
Between these two moments is the leap, which no science has explained and which no science can explain. He who becomes guilty
in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become.
Anxiety is a feminine weakness in which freedom faints. Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin always takes place in weakness. But
anxiety is of all things the most selfish. (p. 61)
Throughout this passage Haufniensis uses two contrasting figures-the
"eye" and" freedom" - as metonyms for the falling individual. Reference
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to "the eye" portrays the failure in terms of being unable to withstand
the anxious disequilibrium induced by the fathomless pit. Disequilibrium culminates in dizziness and fainting, neither of which suggests
free choice of the will. This metaphor thus emphasizes the quantitative
increase in anxiety that gradually overtakes a person. When Haufniensis alternatively portrays the self as "freedom," he emphasizes the
self's volition. Freedom has motivations and desires (it "wants to posit
the synthesis") and so "lays hold" (gribe: to seize or clutch) of the finite for security. Whereas the eye indicates the passivity and perhaps
inevitability of failure, freedom indicates the responsibility of the one
who sins. Though the narrative is coherent, the metaphors within it are
mixed or even competitive. Interestingly, the metonyms also exchange
characteristics-without becoming unified. Haufniensis notes the eye's
responsibility for the vertigo ("it is just as much in his own eye as in the
abyss"), and emphasizes alternative choices ("for suppose he had not
looked down"), even though he first described the eye as having accidentally "happen[ ed] to look down." Freedom too both "leaps" into
sin and faints in "feminine weakness." It grasps after finitude but also
'succumbs" to (segner: "drops" "sinks into") a dizziness that gets the
best of it.
Haufniensis here somewhat erratically conveys both the fallibility and
the fault of sinners; he both condemns the one who falls and assuages his
guilt; and he depicts moral failure as both a quantitative slide and a qualitative leap. Haufniensis even asserts that the purpose of such alternating
depictions is to maximize ambiguity: "He who becomes guilty in anxiety
becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become" (p. 61). The
"moment" in which this Fall occurs expresses this ambiguity perfectly.
Literally, the "moment" (0ieblikke) means a "blink of the eye." But in colloquial Danish it can also mean the eye's sideways glance, a brief looking
away. One suggests a failure no more intentional than blinking or needing
to sneeze. The other connotes an intentional diversion-the unwillingness
to be attentive.
If the disparate metaphors within Haufniensis's Fall narrative register
his dissonant voices, those voices can be heard in other key passages as
well. In the first chapter, the discord arises when Haufniensis describes
the human choice to sin as without context or motivation before twice denying that he is a Pelagian. In §2 Haufniensis speaks of sin presupposing
itself, of "sin [coming] into the world by a sin" (p. 32). When "the understanding" wants to explain this circular self-presupposition, it gets more,
not less, confused. Section 3 then shores up sin's self-presupposition by
refusing to understand innocence as having an inner teleology toward being annulled (contra Hegel). Both sections emphasize that sin comes about
through a freely chosen, qualitative leap that remains incommensurable
with that which precedes it. Though consistent on this point, each section concludes by appealing to a contrasting perspective. Haufniensis introduces these appeals as a defense against the charge of Pelagianism-a
charge which he assures the reader is entirely misplaced (pp. 34, 37). The
aspect of Pelagianism pertinent here is the idea that individuals freely sin
without influence from structures of society or patterns of history.2o The
first protestation reads in full as follows:

262

Faith and Philosophy

It hardly needs to be said that this view is not guilty of Pelagianism,

which permits every individual to play his little history in his own
private theater unconcerned about the race. For the history of the
race proceeds quietly on its course, and in this no individual begins
at the same place as another, but every individual begins anew, and
in the same moment he is at the same place where he should begin
in history. (pp. 34-35)
By admitting that the history of race changes each generation's starting
point, Haufniensis strives to affirm the relevance of historical and collective circumstances. But it is not clear how the historical advance and membership in the human race qualifies an individual's decision. Haufniensis
only retains the contrast between external influence and individual decision by distinguishing historical circumstance from the fact that "every
individual [nonetheless] begins anew."
In the second defense against Pelagianism, Haufniensis again holds
divergent conceptions together by way of contrastive rhetoric: sinfulness
increases, but innocence is only lost by a leap; one may be more or less
disposed to sin, but this more or less cannot constitute the concept of guilt.
His defense against Pelagianism appears not to change the fundamental
nature of falling into sin or the way in which sin presupposes itself. Sin
is explained by sin; this enigma remains indifferent if not impervious to
supplemental, mediating explanations, just as the leap into sin remains
undetermined by degrees of prior sinfulness. At best, theological assertions about the interruption of sin and psychological observations about
the increasing possibility of sin reciprocally delimit one another. They do
not lead to reciprocal reformulations of the natures of sin and anxiety.
Throughout the second chapter of CA, the author's rhetorical voices are especially telling: the more an increase in anxiety seems to assuage the enigma
of sin, the more vehemently Haufniensis insists that it cannot or should not
do so. Chapter Two focuses on postlapsarian (Haufniensis says" derived")
individuals, and contrasts their situation with that of Adam (or with the
first sin of each individual). He distinguishes each postlapsarian individual
from Adam insofar as derived individuals can become anxious not only or
especially over limitless possibility, or the "possibility of possibility' (p. 42),
but also and frequently over the possibility of sin. Postlapsarian individuals perceive sin in the world and have a "presentiment' that they too will
become sinners. They reflect on this possibility and become anxious about
it. Whereas their presentiment and ensuing anxiety do not "cause" moral
failure, they do seem to make sin "easier" (p. 60). Insofar as postlapsarian
persons believe that they will fall, they de facto have already fallen.
In this context, Haufniensis is fascinated by what he twice calls the
"maximum" scenario. In such a situation, sin perpetuates itself, bypassing as it were the interruption of an individual's volition. He describes the
possible or ideal case in which" a person seems to become guilty merely
through anxiety about himself, something that could not have happened in
the case of Adam" (p. 53), or again, the case in which "an individual in anxiety about sin brings forth sin" (pp. 74-75). Such moral failure would seem
like an easy transition: "The more reflective[ly] one dares to posit anxiety,
the easier it may seem for anxiety to pass over [at slaac over] into guilt" (p.
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60). At maximum, sin itself would bring about more sin-without a qualitative interruption. Haufniensis is fascinated with this worst-case scenario;
he returns to it here and throughout his corpus under the figure of "the
demonic." However, one notices that it is exactly in those places where
Haufniensis imagines sin to be a self-perpetuating state that he most emphatically rejects this possibility. Indeed, he rejects it quite "dogmatically,"
i.e., without allowing the phenomenon of the slide into sin to influence his
assertion. The voices of Haufniensis thus appear most dissonant in this
chapter. Even as he presents the possibility of sin bringing about sin, he
emphatically asserts on dogmatic grounds that this is impossible.
For example, immediately after Haufniensis introduces the maximum
case, he objects:
It is nevertheless true that every individual becomes guilty only
through himself; yet what is quantitative in his relation to the race in
this case reaches its maximum here and will have the power to confuse every view so long as one does not hold fast [fastholder] to the
distinction specified earlier between the quantitative accumulation
and the qualitative leap. (pp. 53-54)

The reader must hold fast (fastholder) to the distinction between the quantitative and the qualitative precisely because the examination of the "power" of quantitative influence threatens to obscure it. And Haufniensis now
can only reassert this distinction despite the ways the power of anxiety
threatens to undermine it.
A second assertion of individual responsibility despite the race's influence follows in a similar manner:
The more reflective[ly] one dares to posit anxiety, the easier it may
seem for anxiety to pass over into guilt. But here it is important not
to allow oneself to be deluded by determinants of approximation:
a "more" cannot bring forth the leap, and no "easier" can in truth
make the explanation easier. If this is not held fast [Holder man ikke
fast pass dette], one runs the risk of suddenly meeting a phenomenon
in which everything takes place so easily that the transition becomes
a simple transition .... Therefore, although anxiety becomes more
and more reflective, the guilt that breaks forth in anxiety by the qualitative leap retains the same accountability as that of Adam, and the
anxiety the same ambiguity. (p. 60)
Notice again how Haufniensis implores the reader to hold fast (fastholder)
to the distinction between qualitative sin and quantitative sinfulness, despite (or because of?) certain evidence that threatens to obscure it. Even as
Haufniensis the psychologist describes" a phenomenon in which everything takes place so easily," i.e., where sinfulness seems to bring about sin,
Haufniensis the dogmatist continually interrupts his phenomenological
observations by asserting that sinfulness cannot bring about sin, increased
ease cannot assuage responsibility, no quantitative "more" can bring
about qualitative difference. If, in the introductory chapter, Haufniensis
presented psychology and dogmatics as somewhat mutually supportive,
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and if, in the first chapter, this relationship appeared mutually delimiting,
then in this second chapter the relationship borders on becoming antagonistic. The two no longer dialogue or even debate; they profess and vie for
predominance. One Haufniensis is fascinated with the manner by which
anxious reflections over sinfulness can issue in sin. The other Haufniensis
adamantly "sticks to" (fastholde) the categorical distinction between fallibility and fault.

II. Anxiety Explains Nothing
In entertaining the idea that anxiety could" explain" the leap into sin, Quinn
and Beabout assume that psychology and theology are complimentary and
that an advance in understanding anxiety amounts to an advance in understanding sin. The increasingly antagonistic dialectic between the mixed
metaphors and two voices of Haufniensis that we traced in the preceding
section undercuts this assumption. These interpreters speak with a voice
that is more univocal, and less conflicted, than the rhetoric they consider.21
According to Quinn, Haufniensis's presentation of anxiety as a "motivation" for sin seeks to explain how sin first arises. Quinn investigates how
anxiety might explain sin without assuming that an adequate explanation
must be cast in metaphysical terms. In his analysis, Haufniensis treads
in medio ground between understanding sin as a causal necessity (which
Quinn attributes to Schleiermacher) and renouncing all motivational factors and any ability to understand it (which Quinn attributes to Kant).
Beabout extends Quinn's analysis by asking whether Hauh1.iensis's understanding of anxiety explains not only original sin but also the inheritance of sinful conditions. In the second chapter of CA, Haufniensis uses
anxiety to characterize the "possibility of activity taking part in a distorted
social structure that is already in place."22 As we have seen, this possibility
is "more developed" and "more concrete" than the possibilities available
to Adam. It thereby becomes the object of a more developed and reflective
anxiety. Beabout concludes that anxiety not only explains the leap from innocence to guilt but also explains each subsequent leap from anxiety-producing conditions, which make one predisposed to sin, to the sinful choices themselves, which are made only through an individual's freedom.
Quinn and Beabout thus focus on different aspects of the explanandum
when judging whether anxiety explains sin. They share, however, the assumption that the phenomenology of anxiety in CA primarily functions
to explain sinful choices, whether original or postlapsarian. Beabout less
ambiguously than Quinn gives a positive answer to his question, "Does
Anxiety Explain Hereditary Sin?" On the one hand, Beabout denies no
less than Haufniensis that anxiety necessitates sin. He thus writes of how
"the sinfulness of previous generations can playa conditioning factor that
influences the fall from innocence without compromising human freedom," and of how "anxiety is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
sin."23 Beabout is particularly careful to distinguish subsequent generations from Adam not in terms of sin becoming more probable, but in terms
of its possibility becoming "more concrete" or "more developed."24 Most
commendable is his conceptual distinction between offering a "causal explanation" and a "transcendental explanation" for sin. 25 Beabout claims
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that the accumulated sinfulness of the race and the increasingly reflective
capacities of individuals "explain" sin by providing the transcendental
ground of sin's possibility.
On the other hand, Beabout often coordinates the influence of quantitative determinants with qualitative freedom in ways which strict transcendental deduction would disallow. He suggests that the socio-historical environment and an individual's freedom together account for his or her fall
:into sin. He writes:
These increases in quantity [of sinfulness and anxiety] affect each
new innocent individual, though they do not qualitatively change
the innocent individual. This means that for each individual, though
the person is born into an environment with others who are themselves sinners and into a distorted social context, it is not the parents,
the environment, or the social context alone that causes the innocent
person to sin .... The fact that there is an increased quantity of sin
and anxiety in the world ... is not alone what caused the person to
sin .... [Rather] the individual who is guilty is always, at least in part,
responsible for his or her sinfulness. 26 (my emphases)
This passage begins by repeating Haufniensis's rejection of the claim that
an increase in quantity can cause a qualitative leap. It ends, however, by
suggesting that together quantitative influences and qualitative freedom
account for sin. The phrases italicized above suggest not only that responsibility for sin is shared between an individual and his or her environment,
but also that the increase in sinfulness in part causes the fall into sin. Beabout repeats such phrasing throughout his articleY Even his final sentence, which otherwise reiterates individual responsibility for sin, ends up
dispersing the causes of and responsibility for sin between the individual
and his or her social context: "While quantitative changes may alter the
setting and texture of the first sin of subsequent individuals, it is still the
case that the qualitative change from innocence to guilt occurs in anxiety,
and hence remains, at least in part, the responsibility of the individual"
(myemphasis).28
By treating quantitative determinations and qualitative freedom as
sharing responsibility and causality, Beabout implies that they are commensurable. He thus treats the difference between the quantitative and
the qualitative in quantifiable terms. Each is allotted a "part" of sin's explanation. Not surprisingly, when the qualitative leap is (quantitatively)
coordinated with the quantitative in this way, it looses its distinctive character. The individual is responsible "at least in part" because the environment cannot "wholly determine" the Fall into sin. If one follows Beabout's
interpretation of Haufniensis, the qualitative leap becomes a small factor
that is "added" to socio-historical circumstances so that they do not explain sin away.
Quinn is much less susceptible than Beabout to "reducing" qualitative
distinctions to quantitative differences. Unlike Beabout, he equivocates in
his answer to the question of whether anxiety explains original sin. Also
unlike Beabout, he refuses to invoke individual freedom to fill in the remainder after psychology has tried to explain sin. Instead, he emphasizes
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that psychology, not dogmatics, offers only a "little help."29 On the whole,
a phenomenological account of anxiety cannot explain sin; it only helps to
distinguish the freedom to fall from utterly unmotivated liberum arbitrium.
Quinn's conception, however, still indicates a direct or complementary relationship between psychological explanations and dogmatic assertions
that is precluded by the conflicting voices of Haufniensis.
According to Quinn's typology, Haufniensis shares Kant's resistance to
the idea that social and historical factors can explain the enigma of sin. He
departs from Kant, however, by permitting psychological factors, including motivations and commitments, to influence a person's fall into sin.
Like Schleiermacher, Haufniensis recognizes that the individual inherits
conditions which are anterior to pure freedom and which occasion or influence the leap into sin. Unlike Schleiermacher, however (and here back
toward Kant), such influences can never impel one to sin. For Haufniensis
the moral vulnerability preceding free choice provides a necessary but
radically insufficient condition for explaining the onset of sin.
Quinn concludes that" anxiety does not explain original sin."30 This conclusion, however, fails to convey the degree to which Quinn tries to locate
the "little help" that psychology offers. He finds that help and the proper
function of anxiety in the way it prevents one from interpreting the leap
into sin as beginning from a place of indifference. Quinn writes, "What
anxiety is supposed to do for us is to preclude the possibility that the qualitative leap is made from a position of indifference, utterly unmotivated."31
In a passage to which we will return, Haufniensis does reject the
thought that sin could be chosen through freedom of indifference (pp.
49-50). But Quinn and Haufniensis reject liberum Ilrbitrium on different
grounds. Quinn associates indifferent freedom with Kant's description of
an individual's a-temporal adoption of a morally evil maxim. In his earlier
analysis of Kant and original sin, Quinn confesses his "intellectual discomfort" with such abstract freedom:
Even if one agrees with Kant that such [social and historical] factors cannot be causally sufficient for the existence of a propensity for
which its possessor is to be held morally responsible, it seems reasonable to feel intellectual discomfort with the idea that they are precluded from having any causal influence in moral character. Worse
still, it is hard to see how Kant could allow even psychological factors
to influence the atemporal choice that produces the evil propensity.32
Quinn nowhere explains his "intellectual discomfort" or why such discomfort "seems reasonable." He only appeals to readers' presumed suspicion of Kant's "unhistorical and individualistic" thought, and to their
supposed uneasiness about uninfluenced, unmotivated freedom.
Has not Quinn, when appealing to the discomfort that arises with the
thought of an unmotivated will, already decided how qualitative volition and quantitative determinations might correspond? He implies that
to leave them utterly unrelated (or to understand them as qualitatively
distinct) would offend human understanding. When Quinn appeals to
feelings of discomfort for evidence against context-less volition, he thus
allows reason in general or phenomenological psychology in particular
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to judge the validity of theological claims. Though he remains more attentive than Beabout to the ambiguous relationship between psychology
and dogmatics and between quantitative determinants and the qualitative
leap, Quinn - by insisting on the little service which psychology might
offer theology-risks judging dogmatic propositions according to human
experience and thus contextualizing the qualitative leap within quantitative progressions.
In the final analysis, Quinn shares with Beabout the assumption
that psychological analyses of quantitative determinants overstep their
bounds only when they fully explain the leap into sin. So long as they
leave significant room (Quinn) or at least a little space (Beabout) for human volition, they avoid "psychologizing" sin and mitigating individual
responsibility. The assumption of Haufniensis, as glimpsed in his conflicted rhetoric, differs significantly. For him, the struggle between psychology and theology is a struggle over which gets to be in charge. If
psychology helps explain sin, then the leap begins to look less like an immeasurable gulf and more like a wide distance made progressively narrower when one attends to socio-historical factors. Haufniensis writes,
'[anxiety] no more explains the qualitative leap than it can justify it ethically" (I" 49). Even by helping to explain the leap into sin, psychology
risks turning sin into something that it is not: ethically justifiable. And so,
even and especially when Haufniensis considers the help of psychology,
Haufniensis the theologian dogmatically insists on its necessary inadequacy: "The only science that can help a little is psychology, yet it admits
that it explains nothing and also that it cannot and will not explain more"
(1'.51, original emphasis).
In this light, explanations for sin risk the same ethical distortions as
does Hegel's speculative standpoint. However tenuous their conclusions,
they are oriented toward the past and motivated by the desire to conceptually align the Fall into sin with the "normal" course of events. In short,
they risk becoming theodicies, in the pejorative sense of that word. More
perilous still, explanations for sin might conceal self-justification within
seemingly unmotivated justifications of God - theod icy might mask anthrol'0dicy.33 Haufniensis at least suspects that scholarly investigations that try
to explain sin conceal a hidden agenda. Some will stave off the need to
confess sin by continuing to explain it.
None of this is to say that Haufniensis or any of Kierkegaard's personae
makes theological claims without appealing to socio-historical or psychological observations. It is only to say that the interests of psychology are
controlled by theological interests, and not vice-versa. By ignoring the
conflicted voice of Haufniensis, interpreters have assumed, first, that psychology could help dogmatic understandings of sin without also threatening to undermine them, and second, that Christian theology should
welcome such assistance without radical re-appropriation. The effect of
these assumptions is to make Haufniensis's interpretation of anxiety and
sin appear as a watered-down version of Hegel's theodicy. On this view,
sin is not necessary, but it is perhaps inevitable. Anxiety does not take one
into sin, but it does lead one right up to it. Quantitative transitions cannot
induce a qualitative leap, but they can help make sense of it. Haufniensis would be uncomfortable sitting so close to Hegel. There is therefore
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reason to believe that anxiety and quantitative progression play a role
clearly distinguished from "leading" to and so "explaining" sin. The final
section of this essay examines how CA proposes an alternative, but no
less positive, function of anxiety.

III. The Benefit oj Sin's Possibility
As we have seen, Haufniensis directly protests speculation about how
innocence necessarily leads to sin and sin to redemptive knowledge.
Through the progressive dissonance of his two voices, he also undercuts
interpretive assumptions that would back away from a speculative theodicy but still understand anxiety as approaching and therefore explaining sin. The problem remains as to the relationship between Haufniensis's
descriptions of anxiety, or quantitative increase in sin's possibility, on the
one hand, and the range of possible responses by the reader, on the other.
If increasing anxiety is not meant to explain sin, what is meant to do?
The aim of this section is to propose an alternative reading of CA that is
both encouraged and truncated by Haufniensis. It also forwards a central
conviction shared by Beabout and Quinn but overlooked by other interpreters, namely, that the anxiety depicted in CA is beneficial. My interpretation claims that the possibility of sin is presented to the reader so that
he or she might overcome it in developing freedom and turning to faith.
Haufniensis mentions the possibility that anxiety, "when rightly used ...
plays another role" (p. 53) and periodically correlates anxiety with the
possibility of religious faith. He clearly portrays anxiety as a condition of
faith's possibility in his final chapter: "Anxiety as Saving through Faith."
Might not CA as a whole present anxiety-producing possibilities to sin as
that through which or against which one builds faith?
Recall that the interpretations I have rejected suggest that qualitative
sin and quantitative anxiety are commensurate, or quantitatively relatable. The alternative is to imagine that qualitative freedom employs and
controls quantitative anxiety according to its own purposes. Haufniensis
sometimes suggests as much, noting that anxiety can be used by individuals to strengthen and shape their freedom. For example, having described
the way the "nothing" that instigates anxiety becomes "more and more a
something" (or how indeterminate possibility becomes the possibility to
sin), Haufniensis declares, "All of this is only for freedom, and it is only as
the single individual himself posits sin by the qualitative leap" (p. 61, original emphasis). The comment is cryptic, but Haufniensis implies that the
purpose of anxiety only becomes relevant as one takes responsibility for
positing sin. He thus also implies that the struggle between observation
of quantitative progression and responsibility for the qualitative leap gets
resolved only when the former submits to the latter. Haufniensis may be
suggesting what Paul Ricoeur will state no less cryptically in the following
century-that "he who confesses that he is the author of evil discovers the
reverse of that confession, namely, the non-posited in the positing of evit
the always already there of evit the other of temptation."34 Only through
the confession of full responsibility for sin do the possibilities leading to
sin become relevant. Anxiety becomes meaningful and purposeful only to
the repentant sinner.
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In other places, Haufniensis more explicitly suggests that the progression of anxiety is good insofar as it provides resistance against which one
develops his or her freedom. The following passage describes the slide
into sin as that which is meant to be overcome:

Christianity has never assented to giving each particular individual
the privilege of starting from the beginning in an external sense.
Each individual begins in an historical nexus, and the consequences
of nature hold true. The difference, however, [between Christianity
and paganism] consists in that Christianity teaches him to lift himself above this "more," and it judges him who does not do so as being unwilling. (p. 73)
Occasions to sin are here beneficial insofar as they might are surmounted.
One might infer that all the quantitative progressions that Haufniensis
considers-the accumulation of sinfulness in the race, the "nothing" of
possibility becoming more and more of a "something," the advancing
anxiety which seems to lead right up to sin-might provide that which
Christians must actively resist. Notice that Haufniensis does not merely
suggest that increasing anxiety cannot make one sin. He also and more
boldly suggests that anxiety can help the earnest develop faith. In the latter scenario, fallibility, anxiety, and the possibility of sin function much
as the Fall functions for Hegel. They initiate a transformation from ignorant and untested "innocence" to spirited and intentional faith. In place
of Hegel's felix culpa, Haufniensis thus begins to develop a strong version
of what might be called felix fallibilitas. The human capacity to sin that
denotes finite freedom and that elicits subjective anxiety is "necessary"
or even "happy" -insofar as the individual actively resists it. Yet, the differences between Haufniensis and Hegel must not be obscured by the
analogous role of fallibility and Fall. Haufniensis recognizes the positive
function of anxiety, but he does so without exhibiting a "false mood" -the
self-justification risked by theodicy-to which Hegel and interpreters of
CA are prone. To better glimpse the novelty and irony of fortunate fallibility, we return to Haufniensis's critique of feigned objectivity, which
encompasses a critique of "indifferent" freedom.
The recognition that anxiety might serve freedom and faith depends
on a standpoint that is more committed than is neutral observation. Haufniensis asserts that the proper mood for dealing with sin is "courageous
resistance" and contrasts such resistance with the wrong mood of psychology's "antipathetic curiosity" (p. 15). Given this fact, one wonders
whether Haufniensis rejects liberum arbitrium not because he, like Quinn,
finds it offensive to reason, but because he suspects that people who hypothesize about unmotivated volition do so to obfuscate their motivations
and self-justifications. The passage in which Haufniensis critiques freedom of indifference suggests exactly this. Although he begins by calling
such freedom absurd (a "nuisance for thought"), he ends by connecting it
to the avoidance of earnest self-examination:
If sin has come into the world by necessity (which is a contradiction),

there can be no anxiety. Nor can there be any anxiety if sin came into
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the world by an act of an abstract liberum arbitrium (which no more
existed in the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it
is a nuisance for thought). To want to give a logical explanation of the
coming of sin into the world is a stupidity that can occur only to people
who are comically worried about finding an explanation. (pp. 49-50)
By rejecting this cognitive nuisance Haufniensis certainly refuses to reduce
freedom to the muscular effort of pure volition. 35 But he also traces belief
in freedom of indifference to a worried (i.e., concerned, interested) attempt
to find logical explanations for sin. In an earlier draft of CA Kierkegaard
further characterizes those individuals who anxiously justify themselves
under the shroud of theodicy. They who are "comically worried about
finding an explanation" for sin are also
indifferent to the fact that the explanation is so inhuman that no person who has lived or who wishes to live can understand it because it
also proposes to explain him. If the explanation of Adam and his fall
does not concern me as a fabula, quae de me narratur [story that speaks
to met one might as well forget both Adam and the explanation. 36
Explanations of sin propagated from third-person, seemingly unconcerned points of view not only fail to "capture" the reason for sin; they
also ensnare the explainer, exposing his or her quest as motivated by the
avoidance of personal responsibility, confession and resistance.
It is therefore in his ridicule of speculative theodicy - and in the accompanying critique of "indifferent" freedom-that Haufniensis commends
anxious fallibility in a way that differs starkly from Hegel's justification
of moral evil. But the relationship between the two is even more complex. Haufniensis's fortunate fallibility actually turns Hegel's fortunate
Fall inside-out since it is the security accompanying speculative knowing that Haufniensis seeks to make anxious. To understand how Haufniensis parodies Heget we must consider CAts examination of the allegedly
anxiety-free state of "spiritlessness" (pp. 93-96).
Spiritless individuals-or rather, masses of people that resist becoming individuals-are "neither guilty nor not guilty" (94). According to The
Sickness Unto Death, they are "too spiritless to be called sin/,37 and it is
difficult to know whether they are better or worse off than the self-conscious sinner. Kierkegaard refers to them in different ways at different
times. They are "the crowd/' "Christendom/' "Speculation/' "the present
age/' "philistines" and-most pointed and encompassing-the "spiritless" (Aandloshed).38 Haufniensis places in the category those who try to
examine sin objectively in order to divert attention from their guilt and
to evade the task of resisting sin. His language here becomes "singularly
direct"39 as he mocks with renewed seriousness the profound comedy of
spiritlessness, its mindless idolatry, the senselessness of its chatter and the
superficiality of its bliss. At first glance, the spiritless are "innocent" insofar as they remain uncommitted to the task of becoming spirit and so
skirt the categories of responsibility and guilt. On closer inspection, they
are guilty of masquerading as innocent or of fantasizing about a return to
Eden. Through self-deception and the avoidance of anxiety these Christian
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pagans of Christendom "never [arrive] at sin in the deepest sense" (p. 93).
Haufniensis is quick to add: "yet this is precisely sin" (p. 93).
The predominant characteristic of spiritlessness is its lack of manifest
anxiety: "In spiritlessness there is no anxiety, because it is too happy, too
content, and too spiritless for that" (p. 95). Those who lack spirit also lack
anxiety and the possibility to sin. In light of this particular diagnosis,
Haufniensis's prescribed treatment becomes clear: a heavy dose of anxiety
to revive the comatose spirit. Interpreter Vanessa Rumble describes the
treatment in telling terms:
Spiritlessness, having lost its sense of the task which is posed to human existence by freedom, must be reinitiated into anxiety, the first
signal of the awakening of freedom and consciousness of possibility.
The usefulness of Haufniensis's portrayal of anxiety lies in its power
not only to describe but also to produce anxiety. The implicit demand of The Concept of Anxiety to its readers is to become anxious. 4o
Spiritless persons must become anxious, capable of sin for perhaps the
first time.
The brief but pivotal attention that Haufniensis pays toward the spiritless manifests the benefit of anxiety vis-a-vis the condition of spiritlessness. The spiritless are doubly-removed from Christian practice-what
Kierkegaard calls "the radical cure" -and so must become capable of sinning before learning to resist sin and trust the Physician's guidance. Like
Hegel, then, Haufniensis urges a break with "innocence." Contra Hegel,
this innocence is not the innocence that precedes moral evil but the presumed innocence that is willed by the cowardly in order to evade responsible commitment. In fact, according to Haufniensis (and Kierkegaard), it is
exactly the disengaged objectivity of speculation (Hegelian or otherwise),
together with the collusion of religion and culture, that sustains the selfdelusions of the spiritless. In attempting to fissure this "innocence" -to
"wound it from behind"41- Haufniensis turns Hegel's felix culpa upon itself. The self-security of those who have justified their sin itself must be
called into question. Becoming anxious and capable of sin is in this case
good, or even "happy": 0 Felix Fallibilitas.
The seemingly obvious culmination of this line of thinking is the concluding chapter of CA: "Anxiety as Saving through Faith" (pp. 155-62). In
it, Haufniensis personifies anxiety as the educator of humanity. He again
specifies the spiritless as those in need of this treatment. For them, entering into anxiety without succumbing to it requires a double-movement of
faith: to "sink absolutely" in anxiety and then "emerge from the depth of
the abyss" and "receive everything back, as no one in actuality ever did"
(pp. 156-58).42 The depths of freedom and possibility, which previously
occasioned vertiginous anxiety, now promise to save all. Interestingly,
when Haufniensis here returns to his analogy of vertigo, the dizziness of
limitless possibility rescues those who are falling rather than occasions
their original Fall. He writes:
In actuality, no one ever sank so deep that he could not sink deeper,
and there may be one or many who sank deeper. But he who sank
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in possibility-his eye became dizzy, his eye became confused, so he
could not grasp the measuring stick that Tom, Dick, and Harry hold
out as a saving straw to one sinking; his ear was closed so he could
not hear what the market price of men was in his own day, did not
hear that he was just as good as the majority. He sank absolutely, but
then in turn he emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all
the troublesome and terrible things in life. (p. 158)
Dizziness-along with possibility and anxiety-is now considered fortunate. Immediately after this passage, Haufniensis admits that those who
sink in possibility risk "the danger of a fall, namely suicide" (pp. 158-59).
Yet this aside hardly diminishes the profit of "whoever is educated [by
anxiety]" (p. 159). If the journey into anxiety is dangerous, its payoff is
immeasurable: "Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has
learned the ultimate" (p. 155).
This final chapter appears to bring to fruition the upbuilding function
of anxiety. However, while Haufniensis does write of anxiety in honorific
terms, he also here noticeably disconnects anxiety from fallibility and the
possibility of sin. Simply put, Haufniensis ostensibly disentangles the benefit of anxiety from the possibility of sin. He does so by coupling anxiety
almost exclusively with possibility as such rather than with the determinate possibility to sin. Recall that Haufniensis earlier had traced the progression from Adam's objectless anxiety to the more determinate anxiety
over the possibility of sin, as experienced by "derived" individuals. One
would expect CA's final chapter to value the latter form of anxiety, since it
this anxiety that is available to the reader. Yet in the final chapter the fact
that "in possibility all things are equally possible" (p. 156) alone awakens
the spiritless from their narrow bliss. As we have seen, the imagery of
"absolutely" sinking into an indeterminate abyss of formal possibility is
predominant. These images recall (and revise) the pure case scenario of
Adam but not the different situation of all other "derived" persons, for
whom possibility presents itself as the possibility to sin.
H it were one's possibility to sin which must be confronted and resisted,
then language of "struggling" with the infinite and" overcoming" anxiety
would become predominant in Haufniensis's conclusion. As it is, metaphors of struggling are overshadowed by images of remaining in anxiety
and refraining from securing oneself, trusting that one will emerge victorious. This limitation may be the result of Haufniensis's own detached objectivity and his fear of duplicating the anxiety he investigates. Whatever the
origin, the celebration of anxiety in the final short chapter noticeably differs in tone and breadth from Haufniensis's more careful, circumspect descriptions. This disconnect is problematic for those of us wishing to tracing
Haufniensis's concept of felix fallibilitas. Specifically, it tempts interpreters
into one of the two pitfalls that we described in our initial examination of
Heidegger, Tillich, Niebuhr, and Farley. For if, with the final chapter, one
portrays anxiety as educative (p. 155), masterful (p. 158), serving (p. 159),
nurturing (pp. 160-61), or even salvific (pp. 158, 162), one risks obscuring
the more obvious danger of sin's possibility, repeating the shortcoming of
Tillich and Heidegger. If, by contrast, one attends to the manifold perils
of anxiety that comprise most of the book, dismissing the final chapter as
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rhetorical flourish, one confines the religious function of anxiety to its role
in occasioning sin, repeating the limitations of Niebuhr and Farley.

IV From Haufniensis to Anti-Climacus
Happily, CA was not the only book that a fictitious persona through Kierkegaard wrote. The Anti-Climacus writings of Kierkegaard's "second
authorship" receive and develop Haufniensis's suggestions concerning
the fortune of fallibility. They do not resolve the tension between fallibility's dangers and benefits, but they do further negotiate that tension
and make increasingly clear that individuals must freely confront and
outwit the possibility of sin. Together, The Sickness Un to Death and Practice
in Christianity commend the battle against sin's possibility without either
downplaying the danger of anxiety or forgetting its benefit. While my
comments comprise only a sketch, they outline the ideal, theological role
of anxiety, once it is fully "handed over" to dogmatics.
The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening is the first of two works by Anti-Climacus (Kierkegaard's persona of a "Christian on an extraordinarily high degree"). In it
the author repeatedly asks in different ways: "Is despair an excellence or
a defect?" (SD p. 14). While the destructiveness of despair (or sin) is more
obvious (it is a "sickness unto death"), its excellence is supported where
Anti-Climacus writes of a "despair that is a thoroughfare to faith" (p. 67)
and asserts that "it is the worst misfortune never to have had that sickness: it is truly a godsend to get it, even if it is the most dangerous of illnesses, if one does not want to be cured of it" (p. 26). The "regression" into
intensified sin, Anti-Climacus suggests, may be more valuable than the
cloistered life that never meets the possibility of sin-the life that is "too
Epiritless to be called sin" (p. 101).
Some have argued that Anti-Climacus here develops a unique version
of the fortunate FallY This claim overlooks Anti-Climacus's categorical
distinction between the possibility and actuality of sin. Initially treating
sin under the category of despair, Anti-Climacus writes:
Is despair an excellence or a defect? Purely dialectically, it is both. If
only the abstract idea of despair is considered, without any thought
of someone in despair, it must be regarded as a surpassing excellence. The possibility of this sickness is man's superiority over the
animal, and this superiority distinguishes him in quite another way
than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is spirit. (SD p. 15)
Clearly, Anti-Climacus considers the possibility of despair/sin to be good
or even "excellent." He contends that "to be able to despair is an infinite
advantage, and yet to be in despair is not only the worst misfortune and
misery-no, it is ruination" (p. 15).
Sickness specifically extends the insights of CA by differentiating between the passive absence of sin and the intentional cultivation and then
destruction of sin's possibility. The "innocent" (read: "spiritless") may be
without sin, but only the righteous have sought and fought its possibility:
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Not to be in despair is not the same as not being lame, blind, etc. If
not being in despair signifies neither more nor less than not being in
despair, then it means precisely to be in despair. Not to be in despair
must signify the destroyed possibility of being able to be in despair;
if a person is truly not to be in despair, he must at every moment
destroy the possibility. (SD p. 15)
Throughout the book Anti-Climacus portrays the battle that belongs to
"Christian heroism" (p. 5). The struggle to "destroy" the possibility of sin
after having faced it distinguishes the knight of faith from more resigned
or stoic forms of moral education, as exemplified by Haufniensis's final
chapter. Two characteristics of this text thus distinguish it from Heidegger
and Tillich, and from CA's conclusion. First, the descriptions by AntiClimacus of the fight against sin's possibility imply that salvation must
be won over-and-against the danger of sin. Indeed, all of Sickness traces
the manifold possibilities for failure in order that they be used -despite
themselves-for "upbuilding and awakening." Second, the fact that Sickness is an explicitly Christian work suggests that the benefit of sin's possibility only becomes available or manageable from within a particular
tradition that forms a particular kind of religious courage. This flies in the
face of Heidegger's understanding of anxiety-and to a lesser extent, that
of Tillich - because Heidegger assumes that the most revelatory anxiety
is indeterminate and ontological rather than determinate and ontic. 44 For
Kierkegaard, the strongest form of freedom is shaped-through its resistance-by determinate possibilities to sin.
Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus's second work, meditates on the
further potentiation and determination of sin's possibility that ensues
when an individual stands coram Christi. The reader of Practice learns that
the greatest spiritual danger-the possibility of taking offense at Christis also a necessary component of Christian faith. Anti-Climacus writes:
Just as the concept of "faith" is an altogether distinctively Christian
term, so in turn is "offense" an altogether distinctively Christian
term related to faith. The possibility of offense is the crossroad, or it
is like standing at the crossroad. From the possibility of offense, one
turns either to offense or to faith, but no one comes to faith except
through the possibility of offense.<ho
If we exchange for "offense" the more general "sin," the final clause of
this passage spells out what CA only sketches-that the possibility of sin
can pave the way to faith. Yet the crossroads analogy misleads insofar as it
suggest that one merely "stands" on the possibility of offense, unconcernedly choosing between sin and faith. Anti-Climacus clarifies that the possibility of offense/sin provides "the repulsion [Frast0d] in which faith can
corne into existence-if one does not choose to be offended" (PC p. 121).46
This repulsing possibility helps shape Christian faith as a particular kind
of courageous struggle.
Practice specifically extends CA by claiming that the possibility of sin
is a gift from God. It claims that even the most severe temptation-the
possibility of taking offense-is given by God for the purpose of being
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defeated. More significant stilt it claims that this gift of sin's possibility is
given not only with the first gifts of creation, but also and completely with
the gift of Christ and his offer of forgiveness. For Anti-Climacus, Christ
himself becomes and remains the sign of offense in order also to be the object of faith (PC pp. 98-99). Whereas ideal Christian existence is classically
characterized as non posse peccare (the impossibility of sin), Anti-Climacus
characterizes it as posse peccare potentissme-the possibility of sin potentiated by Christ to the highest power. Blessed is the one who is not offended
by the particularity of Christ and his unbounded forgiveness-having
first recognized the scandalous possibility of offense.
Unlike Niebuhr and Farley, Anti-Climacus thus writes of the benefit of
sin's possibility in ways that are centrally theological, and even Christological. Anxious fallibility accompanies the gift of Christ, and overcoming
it belongs to the work of Christian redemption. Together the works by
Anti-Climacus can expound on what Haufniensis proposes, and can do so
because they understand the anxiety-producing possibilities to sin" dogmatically" -as that which shall be encountered and destroyed.
I hope that evoking the works of Anti-Climacus in response to the limitations of Haufniensis does not seem like lowering a deus ex machina. The later
works do not solve a problem of CA, but gesture toward the service that fallibility and the possibility of sin increasingly give to theology once it "takes
over" the findings of psychology. I hope too that drawing together two Kierkegaardian pseudonyms does not seem to conflate the various authorial
perspectives. If anything, it helps to highlight important differences in the
authorship between plural and singular voices, non-committed and confessional perspectives, and stoic endurance and Christian courage. I have
shown that Kierkegaard shares with Hegel the conviction that full human
flourishing surpasses the goal of "innocence." Unlike Hegel-indeed, as a
Hegelian inversion - Kierkegaard resists the speculative standpoint, with
its ability to "grasp" a fortunate Fall. Those who have secured themselves
through philosophical-religious knowing should become fallible, anxious,
and capable of sin, if they too wish to surpass the entrapments of false
innocence. In order to pass from untested innocence to robust righteousr;,ess, Christians need no more and no less than the possibility of sin - a gift
which they accept by destroying, as they courageously cling to Christ. 47
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